

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Intelligence Report

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Office of Intelligence Research

SOVIET SENSITIVITIES

The Psychological Strategy Board has requested a preliminary report illustrating the Soviet Government's sensitivities as revealed by the scope and tenor of its reactions to various US moves and statements. In response to that request, this report sets forth a series of examples, excluding, however, mention of major US moves connected with defense arrangements, since there is no need to illustrate Soviet sensitivity to any action that serves to strengthen the military position of the US.

Like any government the USSR is sensitive to any development that Soviet leaders regard as an actual or potential threat to their power position. Unlike most governments, however, the Soviet leaders have both a near psychopathic hypersensitivity toward threats, real and imagined, and an unusual definition of what constitutes power.

This hypersensitivity springs from a variety of sources: the suspicions inevitably bred by any atmosphere of conspiracy, the anxieties implicit in any regime that rules by coercion rather than by consent, the tensions of totalitarianism, the distrust inherent in their guiding premise of immutable hostility between Communists and non-Communists.

Their concept of power is also unique. For them power is not confined simply to control of the political apparatus; it is implicit in all human activity. Accustomed as revolutionaries to exploiting even minor organizations and functions to enhance their political influence, they are understandably wary, once they become rulers, of any independent group or activity. Since in their view power is potentially everywhere, they insist above all on concentrating in their own hands a complete monopoly of power -- total in quantity, absolute in quality. All facets of Soviet life, from composing poetry to breeding cattle, must therefore come under their control. To tolerate freedom of choice for individuals would be, in their outlook, to dilute their power position. To share power, however inco-sequential, would be to lose it.

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With this broad definition of what constitutes power, the Soviet leaders obviously have a far wider range of sensitivities than most other governments. Moreover, their supersensitive outlook can lead them to imagine some threats to their position and to magnify the proportions of others.

This acute sensitivity to even the slightest potential threat to their power position is matched, however, by a calloused insensitivity to the costs of preserving this position. If they consider it necessary, they are willing to shoot down an unarmed foreign aircraft, or lash their people with forced collectivization, or sign a pact with Hitler, or kidnap a Russian defector — regardless of the unfavorable repercussions. To be sure they are sensitive to these repercussions, for such actions weaken the hoped-for pull of their claims to be the champions of peace and humanity. But they are willing to expose this vulnerability in the war of words in order to protect what they consider to be their power interests. "Let the enemy consider us nasty people," says a Pravda article. "From the mouths of the enemy this is praise."

Their acute sensitivity has led them to take unprecedented steps to lessen their vulnerabilities. The people of no other modern state, for example, have been so thoroughly isolated, insulated, and inoculated against possible foreign political infections as have the Soviet people. At the same time, Soviet propagandists seek to shelter their vulnerabilities by always taking an offensive line in an effort to force non-Communists to concentrate on defending their own system.

Thus when a Western action touches a Soviet sensitivity, it often ignites a response that, while perhaps defensive in origin, is offensive in form. For example, the US Mutual Security Act, with its provision for \$100 million to assist refugees from Communist countries, has been seized upon by the USSR to substantiate its charges that the US menaces peace and to justify its intensive drive throughout the Soviet orbit for greater vigilance and discipline on the part of the local peoples.

At other times the Soviet response takes the opposite form, that of complete silence. The USSR, for example, is clearly sensitive to personal attacks on Stalin. But it rarely responds to these attacks, preferring instead to ignore them rather than to drag Stalin's name into any exchange.

Thus, in analyzing Soviet vulnerabilities in terms of known sensitivities, it is necessary to examine each situation independently. The fact that the USSR reacts strongly to any particular US action does not necessarily indicate Soviet sensitivity on this point. It frequently simply reflects the effort of Soviet propagandists to capitalize on a development for their own psychological warfare purposes. Moreover, the intensity of Moscow's reaction is not always an accurate gauge of sensitivity, for vehemence is a common ingredient of Soviet propaganda attacks.

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Even where a real sensitivity on a particular issue can be assumed, it does not necessarily indicate a vulnerability in the Soviet position worth psychological exploitation. In some cases, the Soviet reaction may reflect not only the attitude of the regime but also the attitude of large parts of the population. Thus exploitation might result in the strengthening rather than weakening of ties between the regime and people.

EXAMPLES OF SOVIET SENSITIVITY

True Picture of Communist Life

US Action: US spokesmen have regularly depicted the gap between Communist myth and Communist reality. Their statements have had added weight when based on the reports of observers in or refugees from the Soviet Union.

Soviet Reaction: Since much of Communism's appeal abroad would be damaged if the actual conditions in the leading Communist state were known and believed in other countries, the Soviet Government has gone to unprecedented lengths to prevent the world from learning about Soviet reality. Its preventive measures are focussed in two directions: (a) to prevent Soviet citizens from any uncontrolled communication with the outside world, and (b) to keep non-Soviet citizens from viewing more than the strictest minimum of Soviet life. These measures, which have always been an integral part of Soviet policy, cannot, of course, be considered as direct reactions to any one US action in depicting Soviet reality. They point, however, more than any listing of Soviet responses to specific US acts, to one of the most fundamental areas of Soviet sensitivity.

To prevent Soviet citizens from communicating with the outside world except through controlled means, the Soviet Government prohibits them from traveling abroad except on official missions, contains them within the Soviet Union by the most elaborate border controls of any state, provides in the Criminal Code that their families be punished if they should flee, prohibits uncensored communications to other countries, bars Soviet citizens married to foreigners from leaving the USSR, discourages communication with foreigners in the USSR by the State Secrets Act that encompasses wide areas of normally unclassified information and by decrees that prohibit Soviet officials from talking with foreigners unless specifically authorized, quarantines Soviet occupation troops in foreign areas and prohibits fraternization with the local population.

To prevent foreigners from viewing the Soviet Union freely, the Soviet Government permits only four types of non-Communist foreigners to enter: diplomats, newspapermen, fur buyers and similar businessmen, and members of specially invited delegations. Each group is closely restricted. Diplomats are barred in effect from visiting more than 80 percent of Soviet territory, their movements within Moscow are subjected to various harassments, and their work is publicly described as "espionage." The artificially high exchange rate for the ruble discourages some countries from keeping diplomatic missions in the USSR. Newspapermen are largely

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confined to the city of Moscow, restricted mainly to reporting what appears in the Soviet press, subjected to censorship, and constantly faced with the threat of expulsion. They no longer are given re-entry permits before departing from the USSR. At present there are only six non-Communist correspondents and applications of other newspapermen for entry have been ignored. Businessmen are largely confined to the Leningrad fur auctions. Selected foreign delegations are carefully shepherded on prearranged tours. Meanwhile, the Soviet Government reveals only the barest information about itself. It refuses to publish statistics on almost all aspects of Soviet life; what it does reveal is vague and often meaningless.

These various measures are designed to block the world from seeing Soviet life as it really is. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union through its own informational activities and those of its foreign Communist and fellow-traveling supporters seeks in an unending campaign to portray Soviet reality in glowing terms and at the same time to keep up a constant and vigorous exposure of unsatisfactory conditions in non-Communist countries. In this connection, Soviet propagandists are quick to seize upon any development in US affairs, such as immigration restrictions or refusals to grant passports, in order to charge that the US has an "iron curtain." Soviet propagandists apparently calculate that by making the US appear totalitarian, they will blunt similar charges against the USSR.

Comment: The scope of Moscow's preventive measures and the intensity of its propaganda efforts provide striking evidence of the sensitivity of the Soviet leaders to foreign scrutiny. One of the few times that the worth of an individual is recognized by the Soviet Government is when he flees the country, as has been demonstrated by Soviet willingness to accept the risks involved in murdering or kidnapping escapees. The Soviet Consul-General in New York, for example, attempted in 1948, the kidnapping of a Soviet school teacher unwilling to return to the USSR. Such incidents as this throw light on Communist unwillingness to allow prisoners of war a freedom of choice with regard to repatriation. The Soviet leaders do not wish to risk having other Soviet citizens become new Victor Kravchenkos, and their sensitivity to such defectors who have "chosen freedom" is outweighed only by their insensitivity toward any relaxation of their controls.

Individual Freedom Within the USSR

Action: Pravda late in June 1951 publicly accepted British Foreign Secretary Morrison's earlier challenge to reprint in full a statement from him to the Soviet people. On August 1, it carried the Foreign Secretary's text together with a rebuttal.

Soviet Reaction: Pravda carried the statement in full, but the text was not reprinted in the provincial press and was broadcast in full only once by the Soviet radio. Pravda's point by point rebuttal mirrored Soviet sensitivities, particularly in that the rebuttal deliberately ignored certain points raised by Morrison. These points were: that British

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Soviet citizens are not permitted to travel to Britain and that the British are not allowed into the USSR; that British publications are not permitted to circulate freely within the USSR while Soviet literature is freely available in Great Britain; that "the government no less than the private citizen is bound by law and the state has no unfettered power of arbitrary action." Morrison's expression of hope that he would "have further opportunity of putting the British viewpoint before the Russian people and answering any Pravda observations" was also ignored.

While Morrison's remarks concerning Soviet refusal to permit free exchange of persons and information were ignored by Pravda, his explicit or implicit criticism of Soviet conduct in international political relations drew sharp denials and counter-charges. Moreover, any suggestion that the internal regime of the Soviet Union was oppressive and dictatorial evoked the reply that the Soviet people were the freest in the world, that only enemies of the people were inhibited. Morrison had made no specific criticism of the Soviet political system, but Pravda nevertheless inferred this from his analysis of the British system and printed an explanation of why the Communist Party was the only party in the USSR, i.e. Soviet people had tried and discarded all others. Morrison's analysis of traditional British freedoms was countered with the customary assertion that in the West freedoms "of much greater significance" such as freedom from exploitation, economic crises, unemployment and poverty, were ignored.

Comment: The Pravda-Morrison exchange reveals Soviet sensitivity to charges that individual freedom is inhibited by the government. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Soviet people attach as much weight to civil liberties and freedom of movement after three decades of Communist rule as do the populations of non-Communist countries.

Religion Within the USSR

Action: The Western press and other media have continually charged that freedom of religious worship is forbidden in Communist countries and that the Communist regimes have persecuted Church leaders.

Soviet Reaction: All Communist fellow travellers going to the USSR always include in their subsequent reports at least one section telling of their visits to churches and discussions with priests and worshippers in the USSR.

Comment: The determination of Soviet propagandists to convey to the outside world that they are a God-loving people is of course in direct opposition to their fight against religion. The constant dwelling on the fact that people still do go to church and are not interfered with reveals a sensitivity to having the anti-religious character and program of the government constantly presented to the world.

Charges of Hatemongering

US Action: Within the past two years there have been statements by US leaders and others, as well as press and radio items, which have labelled and analyzed aspects of the Soviet Hate-America campaign.

Soviet Reaction: In propaganda, especially that directed to those whom the Soviet Union hopes will be swayed to become part of the peace campaign, an effort has been made to deny that the USSR has any responsibility for encouraging hatred. New Times (August 13, 1952) denied explicitly any hate campaign and instead pointed to Soviet expressions of peace and friendship for the American people. Soviet bloc spokesmen at the World Peace Council meeting in Berlin in July 1952 made a point of reaffirming their friendship for the American people.

Comment: The USSR showed sensitivity to possible foreign reactions to charges that it is conducting a "hate campaign." Significantly Soviet denials appeared only in foreign-language publications. Within the USSR the "hate US campaign" has been increased.

Forced Labor

US Action: US official and unofficial spokesmen have repeatedly called attention since the autumn of 1948 to forced labor in the USSR. The issue was brought up in the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1948, and Army Secretary Royall made a statement in December 1948. The issue has received particularly widespread publicity since it was taken up by the American Federation of Labor, beginning in February 1949 at the 8th session of the UN Economic and Social Council.

Soviet Reaction: When the issue of forced labor was first raised in the UN General Assembly in October 1948, Moscow failed to comment. On December 29, 1948, however, Izvestiya carried a TASS statement denying the comments on forced labor delivered by Royall. Moscow reacted almost immediately to the discussion in ECOSOC in February 1949 by charging that the "real modern slave owners" are the "capitalists." On February 28 the Soviet delegation to ECOSOC introduced a counter-resolution urging the establishment of a trade union commission to investigate "real working conditions" throughout the world on the basis of data submitted by governments and trade unions. In early March Moscow apparently felt the need to go somewhat beyond its denunciations of the forced labor charges by admitting that "corrective labor institutions for criminal offenders" did exist, but that they were far more humane than prisoners in capitalist countries. During the renewed discussion of forced labor in ECOSOC in July-August 1949, the Soviet press and radio devoted more space than ever before to the issue. Since the submission by the UK on July 22, 1949 of the Soviet Labor Codex for UN review, the Soviet UN delegates have increased their efforts to defend working conditions in the labor camps.

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Comment: Obviously this patent abuse of human labor by "the land of the proletariat" constituted adverse publicity of the worst sort. Moscow tried to remain silent as long as possible, but finally concluded that it was preferable to join battle, by launching a counterattack and by strengthening its own defenses.

Internal Living Conditions

US Action: As a part of a campaign to counter Soviet propaganda regarding living conditions in the USSR, there appeared in many parts of the world press during 1951 reprints of cartoons and photographs taken from the Soviet "humor" magazine Krokodil. These cartoons and photographs were the biting criticisms of the readers of Krokodil and presented the most negative side of Soviet life. The USIS for a time carried a regular mat service for reprinting these cartoons by the field posts. They also appeared widely in the French press.

Soviet Reaction: On September 7, 1951 the USSR Information Bulletin (Washington) carried an article on "Crocodile -- the Soviet Satirical Magazine," explaining the function of the magazine as part of the process of Soviet criticism and self-criticism, and complaining that "the world press makes a practice of reprinting material from Krokodil on a large scale. It treats what is an exception to the rule as typical." The article continued by bitterly denouncing this effort to "depict Soviet life in a distorted manner." For about a year thereafter, there was a definite trend away from the negative aspects of Soviet life in Krokodil illustrations and a strong emphasis on the positive side. This carried down even to the letters to the editor. There has been some return to the negative, but the magazine now devotes itself almost 90 percent of its major cartoons to the Hate America campaign.

Comment: The pictures used and also the original Russian captions did show an entirely different side of Soviet life than their regular propaganda. Suddenly the propagandists found their stories about the good life were being sabotaged by their own publication with its cartoons and pictures showing just the opposite conditions. In order to support their propaganda they attempted to cut down on the source which the outside world was using to tell the opposite story. Their action showed a definite sensitivity to the exposing of real living conditions and a desire to hide reality from the outside world.

True Picture of non-Communist Life

US Action: The US information service has sought, largely through Voice of America broadcasts, to give the Soviet people a true picture of conditions outside of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Reaction: The Soviet leaders have taken extensive measures to prevent the Soviet people from being able to compare their existence with life in non-Communist countries. Soviet citizens are discouraged from

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talking with foreigners in the Soviet Union. Western publications are not permitted free circulation within the USSR. Foreign broadcasts to the USSR are heavily jammed. Soviet citizens abroad are kept under careful surveillance, and when they return to the Soviet Union, they are subjected to political "disinfection" procedures.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government with its complete monopoly of all information media, conducts an unceasing campaign to discredit conditions abroad and to convince its people and others that the picture of the free world and especially the American way of life as presented by VOA and other media is a complete fabrication and distortion. The Soviet communications network's over-all policy has been to use symbols which will predispose the audience to disbelieve messages emanating from the source -- VOA or what it may be. The standard symbol, of course, is the argument that such sources are but the "arm of aggressive monopoly capitalists," that the real voice of the people who would tell the truth is suppressed and stifled.

Few phases of American life has escaped attack by Soviet propaganda -- American culture, morality, standard of living have all received their full share of vituperative attacks. Almost without exception, any issue of a Soviet newspaper or broadcast hammers the thesis of the vast army of unemployed, the strikes, the discriminatory policy on minorities, the farce of political freedom for the masses.

Comment: The persistency and volume of the attacks leave no doubt of Soviet marked sensitivity to the portrayal of conditions, both political and economic, in the non-Communist world. So long as the Soviet people have no basis for comparing their own standard of living, their cultural and political conditions with those of other countries, the Soviet Government can hope to show its population a steady if small improvement in living conditions from year to year and claim the superiority of Soviet institutions. If the Soviet people could compare the returns on their efforts with the returns enjoyed by the peoples of some Western countries, even considerations of national pride would not necessarily overcome feelings of dissatisfaction. Since the Soviet leaders do not wish to increase the task of extracting a maximum productive effort from their population, they will continue to maintain, if not strengthen, the present barriers to news of the outside world, regardless of foreign charges that the USSR is closed off by an Iron Curtain.

Despite these preventive measures, continued Communist sensitivity to VOA broadcasts is demonstrated by the persistent attacks the VOA is subjected to in the Communist press, punitive measures against listeners in Hungary, official charges that the VOA is an instrument of subversion, and the special efforts made to rebut its statements. In Rumania a Stakhanovite miner who the VOA said had contracted tuberculosis from overwork was put on the air by Radio Bucharest to disprove the charge. After the VOA had broadcast that the draft of the new Rumanian constitution

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published in July 1952 presaged that country's incorporation into the USSR, a change was made in the final draft before its adoption in September to include the words "sovereignty of the Rumanian state."

Communist Monopoly on Progress

US Action: US spokesmen regularly depict the economic and social gains being made by non-Communist countries.

Soviet Reaction: A key Communist propaganda theme is that real economic progress can be made only under the Communist system. To deny this would be to deny the validity of Communism. Accordingly, the Communists have traditionally focussed their attacks on exposing shortcomings in non-Communist countries, discrediting or ignoring any real gains made under non-Communist auspices, and exaggerating progress within the USSR. A major facet of their constant preoccupation with proving the superiority of the Communist system has been their sensitivity to the actions of "social democrats" who promise the fruits of Marxism without the bloodshed of revolution. The Socialists are vehemently assailed (except in Popular Front tactical periods) as even greater enemies of the working class than the capitalists. A recent example of Soviet sensitivity to Socialist actions was Moscow's reactions to the meeting of Asian Socialists in Rangoon, January 5 to 15, 1953. The meeting was also attended by British Socialists and a Yugoslav delegation.

The Soviet press and radio gave unusually heavy attention to the conference. Its participants were denounced as "lackeys" of US imperialism and enemies of national liberation in the colonial areas. Several commentaries attacked the expressions of anti-colonialism at the parley as a "device" aiming to deceive the peoples of Asia. Clement Attlee was singled out for particular vituperation for his efforts to secure unity between European and Asian Socialists. Peiping ignored the conference except for a single editorial a week after its conclusion.

Comment: Moscow's reaction appeared to discredit any group which can claim with some validity to be opposed to imperialism but which is opposed to Communism as well. Peiping's silence appeared to indicate a desire to avoid antagonizing "fellow-Asians" some of whom might still seek a modus vivendi with Communist China. Peiping's one comment concentrated almost exclusively on attacking Attlee rather than the Asian Socialists. In this connection, Soviet treatment of "independent Communism" as symbolized by Tito's Yugoslavia is divided between heavy emphasis on charges that Tito has no claim to being a Communist and virtual glossing over Tito's existence. Most Communist propaganda on Tito is directed to Yugoslavia. Pravda itself, for example, devoted less than 0.5 percent of its foreign news space in 1952 to Yugoslavia.

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Sino-Soviet Relations

US Action: Secretary Acheson on January 12, 1950 charged at the National Press Club that the USSR was detaching Manchuria and other areas from China and had completed this process in Outer Mongolia.

Soviet Reaction: After more than a week's silence, the Soviet press on January 22 carried a TASS dispatch from Peiping attacking the Acheson statement. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky on January 23 went to the length of issuing a formal statement which denounced Acheson's "absurd" and "monstrous" remarks. For several weeks Soviet propaganda continued to attack the Acheson statement along these lines and said that the US was trying in vain to split the alliance between the USSR and Communist China. Outer Mongolia also issued a formal denial which was given considerable publicity by Moscow and Peiping.

Comment: This Soviet reaction betrays a sensitivity to any suggestion that the USSR is encroaching on Chinese Communist sovereignty.

US Action: The US press during the General Assembly session in October 1952 published reports that Soviet and US delegates were negotiating behind the scenes on the Korean issue.

Soviet Reaction: Although the US Government on October 25 had already denied these reports, TASS on November 3 also issued a denial.

Comment: The TASS denial appeared to be a further effort to make clear to Peiping that Moscow was not negotiating behind its backs on an issue vital to the Chinese Communists. Conversely, when Vyshinsky on November 26 announced Peiping's complete support for his rejection on the Indian resolution on Korea, it appeared to indicate Communist anxiety to make clear Sino-Soviet solidarity.

Soviet Espionage

US Actions: The US Government has charged certain American citizens with committing espionage on behalf of the USSR. It has also requested the USSR at times to withdraw Soviet officials in this country (Gubitchev, Novikov) who have been implicated in espionage.

Soviet Reaction: Moscow devoted considerable effort to denouncing as US-inspired "slander" the findings in the Canadian spy trials of 1946. Since that time, however, Moscow has apparently felt silence to be a better policy. Soviet media in general completely ignore these developments. Although Soviet propaganda reported the Gubitchev case, it never revealed the espionage aspects. The Soviet Union has ignored the Rosenberg case, and while the satellites have discussed it as evidence of US persecution of "progressives" and Jews, they have omitted any mention of the espionage charges, except for one Bulgarian broadcast.

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Comment: Since the USSR is the self-styled champion of peace and cooperation, it refuses to admit, even by denials, that it is engaged in espionage activity.

East German Refugees

US Action: The US press and other media have publicized the unprecedented number of refugees fleeing from East Germany, particularly in recent weeks.

Soviet Bloc Reaction: Soviet sensitivity both to the exodus of refugees and to US publicity has been demonstrated by the increased control measures taken to block movements into West Berlin and by the gymnastics of the East German propaganda line in attempting to explain the situation. The propagandists have tried the themes that three times as many refugees flee to East Germany than to the West, that refugees from East Germany are few in number, that they are largely "criminals," "saboteurs," "big landowners," and "scum," that a dire fate awaits any East German refugee and that many are now disillusioned and wish to return, that the East German regime is "generous" and welcomes any refugee that wishes to return. Finally East German Premier Grotewohl felt it necessary to devote part of his budget speech on January 28 to the mass exodus and sought to reassure the East German population that "No decent person here who does his work and obeys the law ... has any reason to seek the despair of the dark and hopeless existence of a refugee."

Comment: The Communist authorities appear to be caught here between two sensitivities. On one hand, they are obviously concerned over the loss of manpower and the propaganda setback represented by the exodus. On the other hand, they are apparently reluctant for the present to establish a complete blockade of movements between East Germany and West Berlin, since any advance preparation for such a measure would undoubtedly precipitate a sharp increase in the flow of refugees before access to West Berlin was completely sealed off and would place upon the USSR the responsibility for splitting Berlin.

US "Subversion" Policies

US Action: The Congress in October 1951 passed the Mutual Security Act (MSA), including a provision for appropriations "not to exceed \$100,000,000 ... for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, or the Communist-dominated areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States." President Eisenhower, in his speech to the American Legion on August 25, 1952, urged support for the ultimate "liberation" of all Soviet satellites.

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Soviet Bloc Action: Beginning with a note to the US on November 21, 1951, the USSR made the MSA the basis for a full-scale propaganda and diplomatic offensive against the US, including debate on the Act before the UN General Assembly. Protests were made to the US or the UN by all of the Eastern European satellites, with the main difference in them being the "evidence" cited to bolster charges of subversion. This campaign was preceded and accompanied by a flurry of "spy" trials in Eastern Europe and by appeals to the population to maintain "vigilance." The campaign subsided in early 1952 but revived in the autumn, partly in response to the statements made during the US presidential campaign on "liberation" of Eastern Europe. Pravda on August 29, commenting on the Eisenhower speech of August 25 painted a highly alarmist picture of US policy in the event he were elected. The areas he planned to "conquer" were spelled out and his alleged policy was described as one that would dictate a "military decision" to the Soviet people. At the 19th Soviet Party Congress, a Latvian party spokesman scoffed at the possibility that Eisenhower would succeed in his alleged designs. Eastern European comments on the President's election were particularly vitriolic in their attacks on his "liberation" policy. The campaign for "greater vigilance" has reached a peak in recent weeks.

Comment: Soviet and satellite efforts to increase vigilance within the orbit and, through an intensive propaganda campaign, to frighten allies of the US with the prospect of their being led into a war through US irresponsibility clearly indicate Moscow's sensitivity. The various US statements on the subject of future freedom of the Soviet satellite countries were quickly spread among the orbit populations. Scattered intelligence reports agreed that one of the results of these statements and of Eisenhower's subsequent election was a quickening of popular hope of ultimate liberation. There can be no doubt that the Kremlin is concerned over the possibility of a concerted US campaign of subversion against the satellite regimes, regardless of the confidence it may have in its own security organs and controls. More important, however, is the Kremlin's concern over popular expectations of such infiltration. If large portions of the satellite populations believe that the US is engaged in a systematic program of subverting the Communist dictatorship, they are apt to become less tractable -- not necessarily in any spectacular way, but in small "passive" ways whose cumulative effect would be at least to impede the efficiency of the regime. To deflate any hope of US success the Communist regimes have ridiculed the Eisenhower and Dulles statements and also staged several "discoveries" and "liquidations" of alleged US spy rings, in which the testimony emphasized the ineptness and stupidity of the alleged spies, and the ease with which they were caught. At the same time the Communist regimes have been intensifying their vigilance drive.

Polish-Germany Boundary Issue

US Action: The US information service has occasionally reminded the Poles that, quite aside from all questions of the ultimate rightness

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or wrongness of Poland's claim to the Oder-Neisse territories, Poland has no solid hold on these territories so long as the USSR remains their sole guarantor. US spokesmen point out that the Soviet Government can and may transfer some of these territories back to the Germans if it ever serves a Soviet political purpose to do so.

Soviet Bloc Reaction: A main element of Polish Communist propaganda is the permanence of the Oder-Neisse frontier and the alleged fixity of Soviet policy in support of that frontier.

Comment: The Polish-German boundary is one of the most sensitive issues for the Communists. The fact that all Poles support this boundary fits in with their purposes; but the Communists are aware that many Poles are dubious about the ability of Poland to keep the former German territories, and that they agree with US statements regarding the possible fickleness of Soviet policy on this score.

Soviet Wartime Policy toward Poland

US Action: The US information service on occasion has reviewed the facts regarding the 1939 Hitler-Stalin agreement to partition Poland, together with data regarding the brutal manner in which the USSR carried out the partition and subsequently ruled its part of Poland during 1939-41. The US also keeps alive the refusal of Rokossovsky's army to succor the Warsaw insurgents during the great uprising of August 1 - October 3, 1944 against the Germans.

Soviet Bloc Reaction: Polish Communist propaganda for several years on the annual anniversary of the Soviet 1939 invasion presented the stereotyped elaborate Soviet explanation as to why the Hitler-Stalin bargain was good for Polish interests in the long run, giving the USSR as it did an advanced position from which to resist Hitler in 1941. But during the past year or two Polish propaganda has tended to gloss over this anniversary in silence. As for the Warsaw uprising, Polish propaganda has sought to prove (1) that the Warsaw uprising was hopeless in any case and was a criminal political mistake on the part of the anti-Soviet Poles who led it; and (2) that the USSR did nevertheless give aid to the insurgents.

Comment: The Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 and Soviet policy toward the Warsaw uprising obviously remain sore points for Polish and Soviet propagandists. Characteristic of Soviet treatment of other developments that Moscow prefers the world to forget -- the Soviet-Nazi pact, the Soviet invasion of Finland, the Soviet invasion of the Baltic Republics -- Communist propagandists are gradually moving away from a defense of the Soviet actions and toward the technique of ignoring them in the expectation that as the Kremlin continues its unending rewriting of history they will be forgotten.

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American Protest Over the C-47 Incident in Hungary

US Action: The US protested to the USSR over Hungary's detention of US fliers from a C-47 that had been forced down in Hungary.

Soviet Bloc Reaction: On December 19, 1952 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky in the UN indicated plans for a full dress show trial. His speech was republished in full in the Soviet press. The same day a Hungarian note to the US, republished in Moscow, announced that the fliers would be tried for overflying Hungarian territory "with the criminal intention of dropping spies and diversionists." The Hungarian Foreign Office stated explicitly that the fliers were to be tried on both counts. On the following day, however, the Hungarian Government announced that the "trial" was over, with the fliers sentenced to three months' imprisonment or \$120,000 fine, although Hungarian law provided a possible five-year jail sentence. The fliers were charged merely with "deliberately" violating the Hungarian frontier because they had failed to land voluntarily. Instead of claiming a "premeditated intention" to drop spies, the communique contained only the assertion that the presence in the plane of such equipment as parachutes and a separate radio made it "plausible" that they were to be dropped to "spies and diversionists."

Comment: Compared to the propaganda build-up, the sudden trial and mild charge and sentence suggested a desire to dispose of an explosive issue as expeditiously as possible without loss of face. The suggestion of a quick change of plans may have been due to the sharp reaction in the US. It is perhaps significant that when the Hungarian Government later protested to the US in June 1952 regarding an alleged violation of Hungarian airspace on May 28 by an American C-46, the tone of its note was surprisingly mild (described by the US Legation as "correct and courteous"), possibly due to reverberations of the earlier C-47 case and intended to undo the psychological damage caused to Communists by that incident.

The Katyn Massacre

US Action: A Congressional investigating committee held hearings in early February 1952 regarding responsibility for the massacre of Polish officers in the Katyn forest in 1941.

Soviet Bloc Reaction: Poland was the first to react in a Trybuna Ludu article broadcast on the home service on February 18 and 19, which attacked the Voice of America as the "Voice of Goebbels" for publicizing charges allegedly designed to whitewash the Nazis and conceal US "crimes" in Korea. The USSR in a note dated February 29 rejected a Congressional invitation to testify at the investigation on the grounds that the US had heretofore accepted the report of the 1944 Soviet investigating commission and hence could only be aiming at "slandering" the USSR and "rehabilitating ... the Hitlerite criminals." Pravda on March 3 allocated two-thirds of its space to rebutting the US charges, including publication

of the note to the US, along with the 1944 report and a TASS communique from Warsaw on the subject. On March 1 the Polish press published an official declaration by the Polish Government on the investigation. Extensive Polish press comment on this document was reviewed in Pravda on March 2.

US Postwar Relief

US Action: UNRRA, the Friends, the Mennonites, the Brethren and other US agencies gave vital material relief to the Polish people during the period 1945-49 and were a prime factor in preserving the sense of community with the West among the people. UNRRA, though an international body with Soviet participation, was known among the people as UNRRA amerykanski.

Soviet Bloc Reaction: The Communist regime attempted to obscure US paramountcy in UNRRA, and also to cut the contacts between US relief agents and the population. Eventually (1948-49) most of the Western relief agencies were forced by the regime to withdraw from the country and terminate operations. At the same time, government propaganda emphasized Soviet contributions to Polish relief.

Comment: There is much evidence to indicate that the Communists are sensitive to the universal popular attitude that the USSR only exploits, does not extend aid, is not rich enough to aid; whereas the US not only is strong and rich enough to aid the world but takes a disinterested and humanitarian stand in doing so, and is a true friend of Poland.

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